The gender wage gap in Vietnam, 1993–1998 by Liu, Amy Y.C.
 
 
 
T
03–5 
 
 
 
 
Asia Pacific School  
of Economics and Government 
 
WORKING PAPERS 
     
 
 AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
International and Development Economics 
he Gender wage gap in 
Vietnam, 1993–1998 
Amy Y. C. Liu 
Asia Pacific School  of  Economics and Government 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
 
http://apseg.anu.edu.au 
 
 
 
sdf 
© Amy Y. C. Liu 2003 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper uses the Vietnam Living Standards Surveys 1992–93 and 1997–98 to examine 
changes in the gender wage gap. The intertemporal decomposition of Juhn et al. (1991) indicates 
that changes in observed variables, skill prices and wage inequality have tended to narrow the 
gap, but the gap effect has tended to widen it, with the net effect being one of little change. This 
finding is in contrast with that for the EEC but in line with the experience of China. Improving 
education about equity practices in the workplace to combat discriminatory attitudes, and further 
decentralisation to facilitate the growth of the private sector, are two of the policy implications 
drawn. 
Asia Pacific School  of  Economics and Government 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
 
http://apseg.anu.edu.au 
International and Development Economics Working Paper 03-5 
 1
 
Revised Draft, 4th Sept. 2003 
 
 
 
 
The Gender wage gap in Vietnam, 1993–1998 
 
 
 
 
 
Amy Y. C. Liu 
Economics of Development 
National Centre for Development Studies 
Asian Pacific School of Economics and Government  
Australian National University 
Canberra, ACT 0200 
Australia 
 
Email: yukchu.liu@anu.edu.au 
Phone: (61) 02 6125 0177 
Fax: (61) 02 6125 5570 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Revise and re-submit’ 
 
Journal of Comparative Economics  
 
 
 
*This research is supported by a Faculty Research Grant from the Australian National University. The 
author is grateful for the permission granted by the General Statistics Office in Vietnam to use its data. 
 
 
 2
 
The Gender wage gap in Vietnam, 1993–1998 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper uses the Vietnam Living Standards Surveys 1992–93 and 1997–98 to examine 
changes in the gender wage gap. The intertemporal decomposition of Juhn et al. (1991) 
indicates that changes in observed variables, skill prices and wage inequality have tended 
to narrow the gap, but the gap effect has tended to widen it, with the net effect being one 
of little change. This finding is in contrast with that for the EEC but in line with the 
experience of China. Improving education about equity practices in the workplace to 
combat discriminatory attitudes, and further decentralisation to facilitate the growth of 
the private sector, are two of the policy implications drawn. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Several forces are responsible for the increasing wage inequality which has been 
frequently noted in transitional economies. The abolition of centrally determined wages, 
which limited inequality between men and women under a central planning regime, 
would presumably increase gender wage inequality. Employers also enjoy increased 
autonomy to reward workers according to their productivity. If men are more educated 
and more experienced than women, then one would expect females to be disadvantaged 
by higher returns to education and experience during the transition. Also, employers 
could use their freedom to set wages to penalise female workers in accordance with their 
taste (Oaxaca 1973),1 thus, widening the gender wage gap. Yet discriminating against 
workers on the basis of non-economic characteristics, such as gender, is costly in 
competitive markets. A more competitive market would act to narrow the gender wage 
gap. The purpose of this paper is to separate out these forces and their effects, and to 
examine how women’s wages have changed in Vietnam during its transition period. 
The next section provides some background information on the changes to labour 
market institutions in Vietnam. Section 3 describes the methodology and the data. Section 
4 analyses the factors that contribute to the changes of gender wage disparities over time. 
Concluding remarks and policy implications are presented in Section 5. 
 
2. Market reforms in Vietnam 
The collapse of many State-owned enterprises (SOEs) led to the introduction of the 
market reform, Doi Moi, in 1986. Vietnam’s transition can be divided into two phases: 
1986 to 1991, and 1992 to the present. The first phase saw substantial structural change, 
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with total state employment falling by about 250,000 persons each year. Unemployment 
increased and real wages fell, by 30 to 50 per cent, because of high inflation (ILO 1994). 
In the second phase, priority is still being given to the state sector. Therefore, the 
private sector has remained relatively small,2 slowing the adjustment of the wage 
structure and making discrimination3 against female workers less costly. Wage reform 
and the contract system characterise the labour market reforms in this phase.4 
In 1993, two important resolutions were passed. They specified the ‘basic wage’ 
to be paid to all employees as a multiple of the minimum wage rate. In practice, 
enterprises have been able to calculate a different ‘basic wage’ for different skills. The 
‘basic wage’ could be set on the basis of an enterprise-specific minimum wage rate—
higher than the economy-wide one—as determined by productivity within the enterprise. 
In addition, as in China, performance-related bonuses from net profits of SOEs could be 
distributed to workers. As a result, skills-based wage differentials have widened. A closer 
link was established between wages and workers’ productivity within a firm. 
Like China, Vietnam has introduced a labour contract system. The 1994 Labour 
Code formalises labour contracts as the basis for the employer–employee relationship. 
Since its introduction, the number of workers covered by labour contracts in the non-state 
sector has increased.5 The introduction of the contract regime gives firms more autonomy 
in hiring and firing. 
These labour market reforms have been implemented uniformly across gender 
groups, but they will affect males and females differently to the extent that their 
observable and unobservable characteristics differ and are rewarded differently. 
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The minimum wage only has a minimal effect on the gender wage gap for wage-
earners in Vietnam. For most wage earners, it is too low to be binding. It is only one-
fourth of Vietnam’s average wage for the domestic sector. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
Data 
The paper uses the Vietnam Living Standards Surveys (VLSS) 1992–93 and 1997–98. 
The VLSS1992–93 was a self-weighted sample. However, the second survey over-
sampled specific domains, so the data had to be weighted. Our sample in each survey 
includes wage earners, between 18 and 60 years, who worked in the preceding 12 months 
and supplied earning data. In each survey, between 14 and 16 per cent of the females in 
this age group were wage earners. As only a small fraction of the Vietnamese labour 
force is examined, cautious interpretation of the results is necessary. 
The female–male wages ratio rises from 0.77 in 1993 to 0.82 in 1998: the gender 
gap has declined. Compared with most transitional economies, Vietnam had more 
equality in pay between gender groups in 1998.6 The mean position of females in the 
male wage distribution is calculated to be at the 44th percentile of the male wage 
distribution for 1992–93, compared with 40th percentile in 1997–98. This indicates either 
that women’s labour market skills have deteriorated slightly relative to men’s, or that 
discrimination has risen, or both. 
The data show that potential experience is fairly stable over time. Women have 
shorter potential experience than men. The average education for females has fallen over 
time, and was lower than that of males in 1998. Given the short time span, it is unlikely 
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that there have been dramatic changes in the human capital stock in the wage sector. 
However, it is possible, if exit from the wage sector into the self-employed sector, or out 
of the labour force altogether, is conditioned on human capital. The data reveal that most 
of the females who left the public sector exited the wage sector, joining the informal 
sector or ending up exiting the labour force altogether. In contrast, males tended to stay in 
the wage sector (by moving into the private sector) upon their exit from the public sector. 
Note that within the wage sector, public servants had the highest level of education. This, 
plus the changes in sectoral distribution—educated females exited but males stayed in the 
wage sector—has led to a lower human capital per female in the wage sector over time. 
 
Decomposition of the change in the gender wage gap 
Juhn et al. (1991) extend the decomposition methods, such as those of Oaxaca (1973) and 
Neumark (1988),  to analyse changes in the gender wage gap. Their method decomposes 
the change in gender wage gap into changes due to gender-specific components and 
changes due to the widening of the wage structure. Based on a male wage equation, the 
change in the gender gap between two points in time, t and t’, can then be written as 
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where wmt is log hourly wages, xmt and b t are, respectively, vectors of independent 
variables and of coefficients. The standard deviation of the residual and the standardised 
residual of the male wage equation are denoted, respectively, by st and qmt. The subscript 
f denotes females. The first term, the observed x effect, is the change in the gender wage 
gap due to changes in gender differences in observed labour market characteristics 
(education, experience). The second term is the observed price effect. It captures the 
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effect of the changing prices of observed labour market characteristics of men. The third 
term, the gap effect, reflects the contribution of changing the relative position of women 
in the male residual wage distribution. It is interpreted as the reward for unobserved 
skills, or discrimination. If discrimination against women in the labour market increases, 
women will move down in the male residual wage distribution. The last term, the 
unobserved price effect, measures the change in the gender wage gap due to the changes 
in male residual wage inequality, holding constant the mean ranking of women in the 
male residual distribution. 
If selective withdrawal from the wage sector, into self-employment or out of the 
labour force, is not accounted for, its effect could appear either in the observed x term, or 
in the gap effect, if the selection is based on unobservables (Hunt 1997). Also, with the 
presence of discrimination, the breakdown of the unexplained effect into the gap and 
unobserved price effects could be problematic, as the percentile rankings are no longer 
independent of the standard deviation of the wage residuals (Suen 1997). Since the gap 
effect could not have changed without a changing pattern in wage dispersion, such a 
decomposition is no longer valid. Cautious interpretation of these two terms is required. 
 
4. Earning differentials between males and females 
The dependent variable is the log of the hourly earnings rate. An extended version of the 
human capital model, including a set of occupation, sectoral and controlled dummies, is 
estimated, first for the pooled sample, then for each gender and year. Hay’s (1979) 
approach was used to correct for selection bias. All correction terms are significant, 
except for the one for women in 1998. The following discussion will focus on the 
empirical results corrected for selection (Table 1).7 
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In 1993, males were rewarded 5 percentage points for each additional year of 
education, 2 percent points higher than the returns to females. The situation was reversed 
in 1998.8 Vietnam’s rates of returns in 1998 accorded with other empirical studies.9 
Potential experience and its squared term, as expected, describe a usual inverted-
U shaped relationship between wage rates and labour market experience. The return to 
experience has declined for all wage earners (although the decline is larger for males), 
indicating that recent labour market experience is more valuable than that acquired under 
central planning. Chase (1998) and Flanagan (1998) report similar findings in the Czech 
Republic. However, a declining experience premium is not found in China (Liu 1998). 
The decomposition results are presented in Table 2. The Oaxaca and Neumark 
methods suggest that discrimination accounts for most of the gender earning differentials. 
In 1997–98, all gender wage disparities were explained by discrimination. 
The gender wage gap has narrowed over time. The empirical analysis so far has 
suggested a very small change in the gender wage gap. Small changes (in absolute terms) 
are also reported for Hungary (0.054) and the Czech Republic (0.049) (Reilly 2002) and 
China’s state sector (Kidd and Meng 2001). The small change in the gap could simply 
reflect the limited impact of the labour reform process, or it may be a result of different 
offsetting forces. The decomposition of Juhn et al. is used to explore such a possibility. 
The observed x effect is negative, aiding the gap to converge. All but the 
education variable help to narrow it. For instance, a shift in sectoral distribution accounts 
for 45 per cent of the convergence of the overall gap. The changing occupation 
distribution of men and women accounts for 10 per cent of all x’s effect and 13 per cent 
of the convergence—a narrowing gap between the fraction of men and women 
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labourers—has offset the widening gap between their representation in professional and 
clerical/trade-related jobs. The education variable, however, hinders the contraction of the 
gap. This may be due to the lower human capital stock of females, as discussed earlier. 
The gap effect is fairly large and positive. In absolute value, it is comparable to 
that in Hungary (0.284) and the Czech Republic (0.256). This component measures the 
change in the mean female position between 1993 and 1998 as compared to the residual 
distribution of Vietnamese males in 1998. Readers need to exercise caution in attributing 
the gap effect entirely to discrimination. The relative position of women in the wage 
distribution could also represent demand or supply shocks (Orasem and Vodopivec 
2000).10 Examination of relative employment growth does reveal a mild demand shift 
away from female government employees (a female-dominated sector in 1993). Besides, 
the gap effect may also be indicative of the changes in unobserved skills (Suen 1997). 
The sum of the observed skill effect and the gap effect is known as the gender-
specific effect.11 The relatively large gap effect offsets the observed skill effect, so the  
gender-specific effect tends to hinder the convergence of the gender wage gap. 
A negative observed price effect indicates that changes in the prices of skills (in 
particular, changes in the returns to labour market experience), have narrowed the gender 
wage gap. Changes in the experience wage effect account for 19 per cent of the observed 
price effect and 0.8 per cent of the overall convergence. The decline in the returns to 
experience has hurt males more, as they tend to have longer experience than females. 
The negative unobserved price effect suggests the male residual wage inequality 
has fallen, contributing to a narrowing gap. Decentralisation in the labour market in 
China also resulted in a lower inequality, but the same does not hold for most of the EEC. 
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Reilly (2002) reports that the unobserved price effect widened the gender gap in Hungary 
between 1986 and 1992. Recall that the ‘unobserved price’ effect may not be a pure price 
effect (Suen 1997). The changes in the wage structure captured by the unobserved price 
and observed price effects contribute to the convergence of the gap in Vietnam. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The results indicate that the convergence of the Vietnamese gender gap during the 1990s 
has been masked by an adverse change in discrimination. The positive gap effect largely 
offsets the observed skill effect and observed and unobserved price effects. 
This conclusion resembles that drawn from China’s experience but is in stark 
contrast to that in western economies and most Eastern European transitional economies. 
For example, the increase in wage dispersion is responsible for the widening gap in all 
Eastern European transitional economies (except Bulgaria). The gap effect acts to reduce 
the gap in all cases except the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and largely counteracts 
the adverse effects associated with increased wage inequality (Reilly 2002). 
The experience of Vietnam, echoing that of China, illustrates the importance of 
discrimination as an obstacle to gender wage gap convergence. Vietnam’s underlying 
cultural beliefs and traditions emanate from Confucianism. Traditional culture tends to 
discriminate against women. As gender wage discrimination is heavily affected by 
employers’ taste and the degree of market competitiveness, it is important to improve 
education about equity in the workplace in order to combat discriminatory attitudes, and 
also to deregulate markets further in order to encourage the development of the private 
sector. The latter strategy could encourage market competitiveness and could increase the 
cost of discriminatory practices. 
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Table 1 Earnings equations (Dependent variable: in log, a thousand dongs) 
1992–93 1997–98 
Males Females Males Females 
 
 
Independent variables With Without With Without With Without With Without 
Potential experience 0.025  
*(1.91)  
0.026 
(2.42) 
.0480 
(3.68)  
0.047 
(4.85) 
0.014 
*(1.66) 
0.017 
(2.47) 
 0.041 
(4.50) 
0.037 
(4.53) 
Pot. Experience2/100 –0.035  
(–1.38)  
–0.039 
(–1.94) 
–.083 
(–3.03) 
–0.085 
(–4.29) 
–0.028 
*(–1.69) 
–0.034 
(–2.37) 
–0.071 
(–3.45) 
     –0.068 
(–3.58) 
Married 0.246  
(2.19) 
0.178 
(2.15) 
.001 
(0.01) 
–0.009 
(–0.12) 
0.119 
*(1.87) 
0.112 
(2.48) 
0.043 
(0.58) 
0.047 
(0.86) 
Migrant –0.115  
(–1.41)  
–0.143 
(–2.14) 
–.026 
(–0.29) 
0.079 
(1.14) 
–0.067 
(–1.20) 
–0.083 
(–1.81) 
–.032 
(–0.50) 
–0.047 
(–0.74) 
Years of schooling 0.050  
(4.59)  
0.045 
(4.47) 
0.033 
(2.00) 
0.050 
(4.27) 
0.037 
(5.20) 
0.034 
(5.26) 
0.044  
(4.15) 
0.040 
(5.00) 
Urban 0.168  
(2.13)  
0.109 
*(1.75) 
–.087 
(–0.87) 
–0.013 
(–0.17) 
0.227 
(3.48) 
0.138 
(2.75) 
0.146  
(1.57) 
0.121 
(2.02) 
Red River Delta 0.175  
(1.22) 
0.077 
(0.63) 
.143 
(0.81) 
0.369 
(2.70) 
0.027 
(0.19) 
0.016 
(0.13) 
0.028  
(0.20) 
0.081 
(0.63) 
North Central –0.306  
(–1.61)  
–0.310 
(–1.98) 
–.174 
(–0.69)  
0.033 
(0.17) 
0.100 
(0.67) 
0.045 
(0.36) 
–0.135  
(–0.88) 
–0.136 
(–1.03) 
Central Coast 0.233  
(1.56) 
0.090 
(0.70) 
.242 
(1.25) 
0.452 
(3.00) 
0.372 
(2.53) 
0.320 
(2.49) 
0.331  
(2.49) 
0.246 
(2.06) 
Central Highland 0.993  
(2.64) 
0.690 
(2.51) 
.353 
(0.95) 
0.739 
(2.40) 
–0.214 
(–0.70) 
–0.284 
(–1.02) 
0.646  
(3.41) 
0.577 
(3.21) 
South East 0.855  
(5.86) 
0.696 
(5.74) 
.613 
(3.41) 
0.899 
(6.72) 
0.786 
(5.74) 
0.708 
(6.08) 
0.653  
(4.78) 
0.619 
(5.25) 
Mekong Delta 0.619  
(4.19) 
0.456 
(3.73) 
.489 
(2.68) 
0.584 
(4.23) 
0.310 
(2.19) 
0.240 
(2.09) 
0.163  
(1.10) 
0.098 
(0.80) 
Majority –.0659  
(–0.52) 
–0.074 
(–0.76) 
.155 
(0.93) 
–0.093 
(–0.85) 
–0.016 
(–0.20) 
0.045 
(0.69) 
–0.068  
(–0.57) 
–0.145 
*(–1.64) 
Government employees –0.357 
(–2.69) 
–0.295 
(–2.74) 
–.073 
(–0.49) 
–0.013 
(–0.11) 
–0.321 
(–4.42) 
–0.311 
(–4.00) 
–0.014  
(–0.14) 
0.005 
(0.05) 
SOEs employees –0.096 
(–0.99) 
–0.058 
(–0.74) 
.006 
(0.05) 
0.042 
(0.47) 
0.047 
(0.66) 
0.000 
(–0.00) 
0.140  
*(1.78) 
0.127 
(2.11) 
Professionals –0.079 
(–0.47) 
0.009 
(0.07) 
.212 
(1.08) 
0.042 
(0.28) 
0.551 
(4.29) 
0.491 
(3.68) 
0.411  
(2.08) 
0.489 
(2.50) 
Office/trade workers –0.028  
(–0.18) 
–0.089 
(–0.74) 
–.055 
(–0.33) 
–0.111 
(–0.93) 
0.128 
(1.00) 
0.110 
(0.86) 
0.206  
(1.05) 
0.315 
*(1.68) 
Labourer 0.185  
*(1.68)    
0.174 
(2.24) 
.162 
(1.05) 
–0.034 
(–0.31) 
0.291 
(2.78) 
0.222 
*(1.92) 
0.174  
(0.97) 
0.232 
(1.30) 
Lambda –0.182 
(–2.15)  
 .220 
*(1.77)  
 –0.110 
*(–1.85) 
  –0.063  
(–0.57) 
 
Constant –1.520 
(–5.61) 
–1.151 
(–5.54) 
–1.48 
(–4.08) 
–1.752 
(–7.69) 
–0.844 
(–3.98) 
–0.705 
(–3.95) 
–1.297  
(–4.44) 
–1.121 
(–4.28) 
No. of observations 520 907 366 615 967 1380 677 1000 
F–statistics 7.65 10.7 8.37 6.92 13.70 13.75 9.75 13.84 
Adjusted R–square 19.57 16.16 12.99 14.75 29.27 26.72 27.07 26.73 
Notes: 1) Coefficients in bold, italic and with asterisk are significant at one per cent, five per cent and 10 per 
cent levels, respectively. 2) Private sector employees, agricultural occupations and Northern Uplands are the 
base for sectoral, occupation and region dummies. 3) Majority: Kinh is the major ethnic group. 3) Potential 
experience: age minus years of schooling minus six (the official school entrance age). 4) Occupation groups are: 
a) Agriculture, fishery, hunting, forestry and animal husbandry; b) Professional, technical and leaders of the 
Party, government, unions and SOEs; c) Clerical, sales and service work; d) Labourers in production and related 
fields, transport equipment operation, and other labouring jobs.  
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Table 2 Decomposition of gender wage gap 
Conventional decomposition 
 
1992–93 1997–98 Intertemporal decomposition D98 – D93 
mWln  –0.087 0.296   
fWln  –0.344 0.102   
mWln - fWln  0.257 0.194 Change in wage gap in log –0.063 
     
Oaxaca   Juhn, Murphy and Pierce  
   Male wage structure       Observed x effect –0.084 
       Characteristics 0.002 –0.109     Observed prices effect –0.027 
       Returns 0.255 0.303     Gap effect 0.295 
   Female wage structure       Unobserved prices effect –0.247 
       Characteristics –0.085 0.105   
       Returns –0.172 –0.299     Of which  
 Neumark            Gender-specific 0.211 
   Weighted wage structure            Wage structure –0.275 
       Skill difference 0.036 –0.064   
       Male advantage 0.069 0.122          Explained –0.111 
       Female disadvantage 0.152 0.136          Unexplained 0.048 
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1 Instead of employers’ taste, some argue that discrimination could be generated by some forms of 
market failure and is an efficient strategy for profit-maximising employers. For instance, Chase (2000) 
finds evidence of labour market discrimination against Latvia’s Russian minority due to the absence of 
an integrated and flexible labour market.  
2 Between 1995 and 1998 the state sector accounted for 46 per cent of Vietnam’s total industrial 
growth. The domestic private sector only contributed 22 per cent. 
3 The term ‘discrimination’ includes the unexplained part of the decomposition that captures the impact 
of discrimination and also the impact of the unobserved characteristics and omitted variables. 
4 This section is drawn heavily from McCarty (1999) and O’Conner (1996). 
5 150,000 workers had labour contracts in the late 1990s, up from 75,000 in the mid-1990s. 
6 Reilly (2002) reports an average value of 0.71 for 13 transitional economies. Kidd and Meng (2001) 
find a ratio of 0.72 for urban China in 1995. 
7 A multinominal logit model with three categories is specified: wage sector (government sector, SOEs, 
private sector), self-employed, and people who are not working. Identification is achieved by including 
variables such as number of children, non-labour income, and dependency ratio. These variables affect 
participation in a particular category but not wages. Then the correction term for wage-earners was 
computed to augment the earnings functions. White’s standard errors are used to obtain asymptotically 
consistent values in the empirical work. 
8 The decline is driven by the substantial fall in the rate of return to vocational education, where males 
are dominant. Flanagan (1998) attributes the decline, which was evident in the Czech Republic, to 
inappropriate skills acquired in vocational training under central planning.  
9 Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1994) and Flanagan (1998) report 3.7 per cent for males and 5.1 per 
cent for females in the Czech Republic in 1988; 4.5 per cent for males and 5.6 per cent for females in 
1985 in China; 12.4 per cent for males and females in 1988 in the Philippines.  
10 In Slovenia, a sectoral demand shift towards female-dominated sectors, and away from male-
dominated ones, results in a large gap effect—women move up the male residual earnings distribution.  
11 Recall that selective exit from the wage sector could show up in either the observed skill effect or the 
gap effect. Selection may not be important in Vietnam as both effects do not change much with or 
without selection correction. They are 0.052 and 0.26, respectively, without selection correction. 
